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Abstract 
The paper aims at analysing the effect of women serving on the boards of directors, especially after the 
introduction of gender minority (Law 120/2011 and Consob n. 18098/2012), and the network ties on boardrooms 
on the overall firms’ performance in the Italian context. Gender minority is defined as the percentage of women 
on the board of directors, whereas the network ties represent companies which are connected through shared 
board members. To do this, we selected a sample of industrial Italian listed companies during the period 
2011-2013 and we downloaded the mandatory reports of corporate governance of each firm in our sample time 
period in order to extract the components of the board of directors and their characteristics. We performed a set 
of regression analysis to evaluate whether the participation of women in the firm’s board of directors and the 
presence of connections among boardrooms enhance the financial performance measured through Tobin’s Q and 
Return On Asset (ROA). Empirical results contribute to extend scientific literature about this topic and to 
provide interesting practical contributions on the role of gender minority and the connections among companies 
on firms’ performance. Parallel, this research develops topics related to text mining (that is the automatic 
extraction of quantitative information from text-documents) referring to all the firms’ disclosures, produced in 
the Italian language. 
Keywords: board gender diversity; firm performance; network analysis; Italian listed companies; text mining 
1. Introduction 
The board composition has been deeply investigated by several scholars who analysed different types of features 
including, for example, the number of directors serving on the board, the percentage of outsider and independent 
directors, the structure of the board committees and the number of meetings to be held each year. 
Within this framework, the recent literature about the introduction of gender minority in the board of directors 
and its effects on the overall performance of a firm is quite controversial. In international context some 
contributions were developed in France, Denmark, German, United Kingdom, but, to our knowledge, a very little 
contribution seems to be developed in Italy (Bianco et al. 2013; Del Prete and Stefani 2013), especially after the 
recent regulation about the gender minority in the board of directors (Law 120/2011 and Consob n. 18098/2012). 
Some scholars demonstrated that the Tobin’s Q is positively correlated to the percentage of women inside the 
board of directors (Adams & Ferreira, 2003; Carter et al., 2003; Nekhili & Gatfaoui, 2013) and that the presence 
of women who serve on influential board committees is more likely to impact actions of the board and 
management (Carter et al., 2010). The basic assumption is that board diversity encourages different and creative 
new perspectives on the strategic decisions increasing the productivity and performance of the corporation 
(Robinson & Dechant, 1997; Brancato & Patterson 1999; Ingle, & Van der Walt, 2003). On the contrary, some 
other academics found exactly the opposite (Farrell & Hersch 2005). It is possible that women cannot make a 
firm level impact because they are a minority in the boardroom. Kanter (1977) postulates that minorities 
performance is less likely to be noticed by the majority members and their opinions may not be readily accepted 
(Kanter, 1977).  
Within this framework, others underlined that the results could be affected by the diverse statistical approaches 
that are applied (Smith et al., 2006). Therefore, previous literature shows inconclusive results on the effects of 
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women in the boards on firm performance. Furthermore, empirical evidence from the Italian context seems to be 
very poor. 
Besides, sociocognitive studies about social network concerning corporate governance suggested the relevance 
of directors appointed to other boardrooms in having the proper strategic knowledge useful for the strategic 
decision making process and for enhancing the financial performance of a firm (Walsh, 1995; Carpenter & 
Westphal 2001). However, some scholars emphasised the potential benefits for a company in having directors 
who are involved in other boardrooms, such as the possibility that directors may obtain private and more 
information through their external networks (Palmer et al., 1993; Stiles, 2001) and the possibility to develop 
inter-organizational relationships, thereby facilitating the performance of the board tasks of service and strategy 
(Zahra & Pearce 1989), whereas few others found a negative association between the presence of network ties 
and firm performance (Kaczmarek et al., 2014). To our best knowledge, in the Italian context, few contributions 
are recently carried out on this topic (Di Donato & Tiscini, 2009).  
The aim of this research project is thus to contribute to the development of the above-mentioned literature 
streams, by analysing the effect of women serving on the boards of directors, especially after the introduction of 
gender minority (Law 120/2011 and Consob n. 18098/2012), and the network ties on boardrooms on the overall 
firms’ performance, measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA, in the Italian setting. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents literature review about board gender 
diversity and network analysis on board of directors along with the research hypotheses development; Section 3 
and 4 present data collection, sample selection and research method; Section 5 presents empirical findings and 
Section 6 discusses results, limitations and further development. 
2. Literature Review and Research Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Board Gender Diversity and Firm Performance 
A recent open debate on corporate governance regards the effects of the gender minority on the financial 
performance and, in general, on the overall performance of a company. Previous literature about this topic 
confirmed the relevance of the composition of the board of directors on financial performance, by highlighting 
some features which may have some effects on the firm value such as different types of diversity e.g. gender, 
racial and culture ones (Carter et al., 2003). According to some scholars, corporate diversity within the board of 
directors and the top management is able to produce more effective problem-solving due to variety of 
perspectives and to increase creativity and innovations (Robinson & Dechant, 1997) and promotes more 
effective global relationships in an international environment (Carter et al., 2003). 
In this paper, gender minority is mainly defined as the percentage of women serving on the board of directors. 
Women hold few corporate board seats even if the situation is changing because boards around the world are 
under increasing pressure to choose female directors. In the UK, the Higgs report (Higgs, 2003) argues that 
diversity could enhance board effectiveness (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). In Sweden gender diversity as a legal 
requirement (Medland, 2004). In Norway, since 2008 all listed companies must have a 40% of female directors 
or face dissolution. Spain followed Norway, enacting a law requiring companies to increase the share of female 
directors to 40% by 2015. The presence of women on boards is also relevant for professionals and standard 
setters, because, as a matter of fact, codes of best practices and several regulatory requirements in several 
countries around the world (e.g. Belgium, Brazil, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Malaysia, Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, etc.) are mainly aimed at balancing the gender in company boardrooms. 
However, there is not yet a consensus on the topic and some scholars highlight benefits relating the presence of 
women, whereas others do not find such similar results.  
Within the first stream of literature, some scholars emphasized the positive effects of female directors concerning 
social issues, such as corporate social responsibility control, because they are more participative (Eagly & Carli, 
2003) and democratic (Eagly & Johnson, 1990), whereas men are mainly money oriented (Broadbridge et al., 
2006; Huse et al., 2009). Other scholars demonstrated that women in the boardrooms have significant and 
positive effects on board governance, since they seem to have less attendance problems than men and since they 
could more closely correspond to the concept of the independent director emphasized in theory because female 
directors do not belong to the “old boys club”(Adams & Ferreira, 2009). In particular, female directors are more 
likely to be assigned to audit, nominating, and corporate governance committees, although they are less likely to 
sit on compensation committees than men are. These results suggest that the higher the percentage of women, the 
higher the effort spent on monitoring activities inside the company (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). Other studies, in 
fact, suggest that females are often appointed by firms in order to lower the overall risk of the company (Martin 
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et al., 2009) because females are perceived more risk-averse than males (Oakley, 2000; Atkinson et al., 2003; 
Lee & James, 2007). 
Others demonstrated that some financial measures of firm value, such as Tobin’s Q, are positively correlated to 
the percentage of women inside the boardrooms (Adams & Ferreira, 2003; Carter et al., 2003; Campbell & 
Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Nekhili & Gatfaoui, 2013). Recently, Terjesen et al. (2015) show that companies with a 
higher presence of female directors in the boardrooms have higher performance both in terms of Tobin’s Q and 
Return on Assets (ROA) measures (Terjesen et al., 2015). Terjesen et al. (2015) also demonstrated that the 
female directors are able to enhance the effectiveness of the entire board by analysing a large sample of public 
firms around the word, therefore controlling the different set of corporate governance mechanisms. 
Others suggested that women are able to offer fresh solutions to complex issues, thus helping correct 
informational bias in strategy formulation and problem solving (Francoeur et al., 2008). Virtanen (2012) 
demonstrated that female directors are more likely to cover active roles compared to their male colleagues 
(Virtanen et al., 1996) and other scholars provided evidence that female directors are more likely to have debate 
than male managers and have leadership and collaborative skills (Eagly & Johnson, 1990; Ingley & Van Der 
Walt, 2005). Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn (2011) found that gender diversity within the board can have positive 
effects on firm operations, especially when risky strategic decisions are to be evaluated (Muller-Kahle & 
Lewellyn, 2011). Gul et al. (2011) demonstrated a positive association between gender diversity and stock price 
informativeness due to an increased voluntary public disclosure (Gul et al., 2011). Furthermore, Gregory et al. 
(2013) demonstrated that, in the long term, the market is able to recognize the positive effect of the women in the 
board on firms’ performance, whereas in the short term, market tends to underrate this positive role (Gregory et 
al., 2013). Moreover, others highlighted that women on boardrooms have more experience in non-business 
activities than men (Hillman et al., 2002). 
The latter stream of literature found a negative relationship or did not find any relationship between corporate 
performance and female directors (Zahra & Stanton, 1988); for example, Ola and Proffitt (2015) found that the 
gender of a fired CEO has no impact on stock price, meaning that males and females are perceived in the same 
way by the investors (Ola & Proffitt, 2015). Some scholars even found that industrial firms perform worse in 
case of a greater gender diversity of the board (Shrader et al., 1997; Adams & Ferreira, 2009), so that in the 
banking industry (Kilic, 2015). This results are consistent with the argument that too much board monitoring can 
decrease shareholder value. That is why some authors found a negative correlation between the percentage of 
female board members and financial value of a company (Almazan & Suarez, 2003; Adams & Ferreira, 2007).  
Also in the Italian context, empirical evidence about the effects of the gender diversity on the overall 
performance of a firm is not clear and it needs further investigation. In particular, to our best knowledge there is 
no empirical evidence regarding the effect of the introduction of gender minority in the board of directors (Law 
120/2011 and Consob n. 18098/2012). In fact, the existing contributions concerning the Italian context are 
related to the years before 2011 (Bianco et al., 2013; Del Prete & Stefani, 2013). In particular, Law no. 120 of 12 
July 2011 (“Law 120”) represented a very important procedural step in the gender diversity awareness in the 
Italian legal system, introducing affirmative actions for women in companies (significantly called, in Italian, 
“quote rosa”, i.e. “pink quotas”). This policy is aimed at promoting a larger presence of women in the governing 
bodies of publicly-traded corporations as a consequence of the perceived underrepresentation of this gender in 
these positions. The Law requires that all companies listed on the Italian Stock Exchange reserve one third of the 
board of directors positions (1/3) to the “underrepresented gender” in the governing body, that is typically 
represented by women. 
On the basis of the controversial findings in international context and the introduction of a regulation which 
regards the gender minority in the board of directors in Italy, we do not predict the sign of the association 
between women on the board of directors and financial performance and we posit the following research 
hypotheses: 
Hp1a: Ceteris paribus, the percentage of women on the board of directors is associated with the financial 
performance of Italian listed companies. 
Hp1b: Ceteris paribus, the percentage of women on the board of directors after the introduction of gender 
minority in the Board of Directors (Law 120/2011 and Consob n. 18098/2012) is associated with the financial 
performance of Italian listed companies. 
2.2 Network Analysis on Board of Directors 
Social network with regard to corporate governance refers to the interaction among directors of different 
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boardrooms, thus identifying network ties. Sociocognitive studies about this topic suggested the relevance of 
directors’ network of appointments to other boardrooms in having the proper strategic knowledge useful for the 
strategic decision making process (Walsh, 1995; Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). Within this framework, directors 
could use knowledge derived from experiences in similar roles (Walsh, 1995). Other scholars on interlocking 
directors previously emphasised the potential benefits for a company in having directors who are involved in 
other boardrooms. Such benefits due to external network are linked to 1) the possibility that directors may obtain 
private and more information through their external networks (Palmer et al., 1993; Stiles, 2001); 2) the 
possibility to develop inter-organizational relationships, thereby facilitating the performance of the board tasks of 
service and strategy (Zahra & Pearce, 1989); and 3) the possibility to reduce incentives for opportunism by 
increasing mutual flow of information between exchange partners (Kaczmarek et al., 2014).  
On the other hand, few scholars instead found a negative association between the presence of network ties and 
firm performance (Kaczmarek et al., 2014) even if the effect of interlocking directorships on firm performance is 
likely to turn positive in the presence of board diversity (Di Donato & Tiscini, 2009). To our best knowledge, in 
the Italian context, few contributions are carried out on this topic (Drago et al., 2011; Croci & Grassi, 2013) and 
no contributions are developed more recently.  
On the basis of the controversial findings produced by previous scholars and to fill the literature gap in the 
Italian setting, we posit the following research hypothesis: 
Hp2: Network ties on corporate governance enhance the financial performance of an Italian company. 
3. Sample Selection and Data Collection 
Our sample consists of all companies listed on the Italian Stock Exchange, with the exclusion of the financial 
sector, in order to preserve the homogeneity of the research sample, since the financial companies are subjected 
to regulatory which could affect differently corporate governance mechanisms and structures (Adams and 
Mehran, 2003). We thus identified 390 Italian listed firms and we excluded financial firms. We used a panel of 
firms during a 4-year period running from 2010 to 2013. The final sample consisted of annual data for 124 
companies over 4 years, therefore, a total of 496 firm-years observations. For each company we collected 
corporate governance documents in our sample time period. Corporate governance reports can be found on the 
Italian Stock Exchange website (http://www.borsaitaliana.it/) embedded as PDFs within a java applet. Each page 
of PDFs is composed by JPG images. Using “requests” (http://docs.python-requests.org/en/master/), 
“beautifulsoup” (https://www.crummy.com/software/BeautifulSoup/) and “selenium” browser 
(http://www.seleniumhq.org/), we wrote a python script to scrape JPG files. After this phase, we rebuilt PDFs 
rearranging JPG images and extracted text using Tesseract (https://github.com/tesseract-ocr) in order to store 
corporate governance documents’ content as plain text. 
Finally, each corporate governance document was tokenized using the NLTK package (Bird 2006) and stemmed 
using the Porter stemmer (Porter & Boulton, 2001). Tokenization consists of breaking down a stream of text into 
words, phrases or other meaningful elements or tokens; stemming involves reducing inflected words to their root 
form. Therefore we trained a Support Vector Machines (SVMs) model able to recognize sentences containing in 
order to extract board members’ names (Joachims, 2002). The list of companies’ board members has been 
validated manually checking the SVMs’ results with corporate governance documents. Therefore, we calculated 
the percentage of women which is the number of women on boardrooms divided by the size board. Furthermore, 
we checked if two companies have a board member in common to build a weighted network of companies’ 
board members. Namely, nodes represent companies, arcs represent shared board members and the weight of 
each arc is given by the number of board members shared by companies. The number of connection for each 
company is given by the sum of arcs’ weights incoming in each node. For each company, we used Thomson 
Reuters Datastream to extract measures of financial performance. 
4. Research Methods 
To evaluate the financial performance of our sample of listed firms we used Tobin’s Q and Return on Assets 
(ROA) as suggested by previous scholars (Hillman et al., 2002; Adams & Ferreira, 2009). In particular, Tobin’s 
Q ratio provides information on how well company’s investments pay off and it is calculated as market value of 
assets / replacement value of assets or (equity market value + liabilities market value) / (equity book value + 
liabilities book value). 
In order to test the research hypotheses, we performed a set of regression analysis that are the following: 
Y = β0 + β1 Share of Women + β2 Connections + β3 Net Sales or Revenues + β4 Dummy for Year 2013 + β5 
Auditor’s Opinion + β6 Board Size + ε                           (1) 
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Where:  
Y is Tobin’s Q and ROA, respectively, and measures the financial performance of a listed company in the time 
period between 2010 and 2013. 
Y = β0 + β1 Share of Women + β2 Connections + β3 Net Sales or Revenues + β4 Auditor’s Opinion + β5 Board 
Size + ε                                          (2) 
Where:  
Y is Tobin’s Q and ROA, respectively, and measures the financial performance of a listed company in the year 
2013. 
Independent research variables for both regressions are: 1) Share of women, which is the number of women on 
boardrooms divided by the size board; 2) Connections, which measure if two companies have a board member in 
common. Control variables for both regressions regards the size of each company, the size of each boardroom 
and the reliability of the financial reporting as perceived by external auditors. Control variables are the following: 
1) Net Sales and Revenues; 2) Board Size and 3) Auditors’ Opinion (we assign 0 if the auditors’ opinion is 
unqualified and 1 if the auditors’ opinion is qualified). For the regression applied for the whole time period, we 
created a dummy for the Year 2013. We normalized between zero and 1 research and control variables. 
5. Empirical Findings 
Table 1 provides some information on numbers of women on boards of directors throughout the years with 
respect to our sample of Italian industrial listed firms. Over the whole sample period, no company has more than 
four women on its board of directors. From 2010 to 2012, the average percentage of women increases slightly 
from 7.153% to 8.500%, whereas it increases highly in 2013 (17.443%). Furthermore, table 1 shows that the 
average number of women on the board is less than one from 2010 to 2012, which confirms the minority of 
women within corporate boards during these years. At the same way, it is possible to observe an increase of the 
average number of women on board in 2013 which becomes more than one (1.597). Moreover, in 2013 the 
percentage of firms with three or more women on board increases significantly (21.774), thereby demonstrating 
the increasing number of women within the corporate boards due to the introduction of gender minority in the 
board of directors (Law 120/2011). 
 
Table 1. Breakdown of the number and percentage of women in the board over each year in Italian listed firms 
Years Average 
number 
of women 
on board 
Percentage 
of 
women on 
board 
Percentage of firms 
with no woman on 
board 
Percentage of firms 
with one woman on 
board 
Percentage of firms 
with two women on 
board 
Percentage of firms with 
three or more women on 
board 
2010 0.589 7.153% 51.613% 38.710% 8.871% 0.806% 
2011 0.699 7.540% 45.968% 41.935% 11.290% 0.806% 
2012 0.766 8.500% 41.935% 44.355% 9.677% 4.032% 
2013 1.597 17.443% 18.548% 31.452% 28.226% 21.774% 
 
Table 2 and Table 3 show some descriptive statistics for all the years (2010-2013) and just for the year 2013, 
respectively. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the research variables for all the years (124 companies over 4 years, number of 
observations = 496) 
Research variable Min  Max Mean Standard deviation 
Tobin’s Q 0.537 12.516 1.620 1.168 
ROA -79.490 31.050 1.276 7.388 
Share of Women 0.000 0.750 0.102 0.111 
Dummy for Year 2013 0.000 1.000 0.250 0.433 
Net Sales or Revenues 706.000 126482000.000 4122687.870 15535182.759 
Auditor’s Opinion 0.000 1.000 0.010 0.109 
Connections 0.000 11.000 1.710 2.352 
Size Board 1.000 21.000 9.220 3.114 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the research variables for the year 2013 (number of observations = 124) 
Research variable Min  Max Mean Standard deviation 
Tobin’s Q 0.697 12.516 1.769 1.541 
ROA -22.320 31.050 1.065 6.560 
Share of Women 0.000 0.500 0.174 0.116 
Net Sales or Revenues 966.000 114722000.000 4282468.540 16350150.498 
Auditor’s Opinion 0.000 1.000 0.020 0.126 
Connections 0.000 9.000 1.680 2.229 
Size Board 3.000 20.000 9.150 2.840 
 
In table 4 and table 5 are presented correlation matrix and Pearson index.  
 
Table 4. Correlation matrix and Person index of the research variables for all the years (124 companies over 4 
years, number of observations = 496) 
 ROA Tobin’s Q Share of Women Connections 
ROA Pearson 
Sig (two-tailed)  
Number of observations 
1 
 
496 
   
Tobin’s Q Pearson 
Sig (two-tailed)  
Number of observations 
0.379** 
0.000 
496 
1 
 
496 
  
Share of Women Pearson 
Sig (two-tailed)  
Number of observations 
-0.032 
0.480 
496 
-0.026 
0.570 
496 
1 
 
496 
 
Connections Pearson 
Sig (two-tailed)  
Number of observations 
0.086 
0.055 
496 
0.103* 
0.022 
496 
-0.104* 
0.020 
496 
1 
 
496 
* Correlation is significant at 0.05 (2-tails). ** Correlation is significant at 0.01 (2-tails). 
 
Table 5. Correlation matrix and Person index of the research variables for the year 2013 (number of observations 
= 124) 
 ROA Tobin’s Q Share of Women Connections 
ROA Pearson 
Sig (two-tailed)  
Number of observations 
1 
 
124 
   
Tobin’s Q Pearson 
Sig (two-tailed)  
Number of observations 
0.455** 
0.000 
124 
1 
 
124 
  
Share of Women Pearson 
Sig (two-tailed)  
Number of observations 
-0.166 
0.65 
124 
-0.116 
0.201 
124 
1 
 
124 
 
Connections Pearson 
Sig (two-tailed)  
Number of observations 
0.089 
0.324 
124 
0.148 
0.102 
124 
-0.047 
0.601 
124 
1 
 
124 
* Correlation is significant at 0.05 (2-tails). ** Correlation is significant at 0.01 (2-tails). 
 
Table 6 and Table 7 show empirical results for all the years (2010-2013) and for the year 2013 for both the two 
dependent variables (Tobin’s Q and ROA).  
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Table 6. Regression analysis for all the years (2010-2013) and for the year 2013 (Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q) 
Independent Research variable Time period: 2010-2013 Year: 2013 
β  p-value β  p-value  
Share of Women -0.059 0.167 -0.128 0.203 
Connections 0.089 0.001*** 0.120 0.089* 
Dummy for Year 2013 0.023 0.036**   
Net Sales or Revenues -0.078 0.035** -0.082 0.365 
Auditor’s Opinion -0.053 0.186 -0.075 0.419 
Size Board -0.071 0.064* -0.063 0.547 
*, **, *** indicate significant between 0.10 and 0,05; between 0.05 and 0,01; and between 0.01 and 0, respectively. 
The statistical significant value (β and p-value) are shown in bold. 
 
Table 7. Regression analysis for the whole database and for the year 2013 (Dependent variable: ROA) 
Independent Research variable Time period: 2010-2013 Year: 2013 
β p-value β  p-value  
Share of women -0.014 0.634 -0.084 0.069* 
Connections 0.035 0.063* 0.004 0.904 
Dummy year 2013 -0.001 0.902   
Net sales or revenues 0.015 0.553 0.019 0.639 
Auditor’s opinion -0.047 0.086* -0.054 0.205 
Size Board -0.025 0.350 0.051 0.294 
*, **, *** indicate significant between 0.10 and 0,05; between 0.05 and 0,01; and between 0.01 and 0, respectively. 
The statistical significant value (β and p-value) are shown in bold. 
 
Empirical analysis allows us to test the research hypotheses. In particular, regression analysis does not 
demonstrate that women on the board of directors enhance or worsen the financial performance of Italian 
companies, therefore the Hp1a (Ceteris paribus, the percentage of women on the board of directors is associated 
with the financial performance of Italian listed companies) is not supported either for the dependent variable 
Tobin’s Q or for ROA. However, the sign of β for both measures of financial performance of listed firms is 
negative, but the p-value is not statistical significant. 
With regard to the Hp1b, regression analysis shows that the percentage of women on the boardrooms after the 
introduction of gender minority in the Board of Directors (Law 120/2011 and Consob n. 18098/2012) is not 
statistically correlated with the financial performance of Italian companies, measured by Tobin’s Q. On the other 
hand, regression analysis for the year 2013 demonstrates that if the percentage of women increases, the ROA 
decreases. Therefore, the Hp1b (Ceteris paribus, the percentage of women on the board of directors after the 
introduction of gender minority in the Board of Directors (Law 120/2011 and Consob n. 18098/2012) is 
associated with the financial performance of Italian listed companies.) is partially supported and deserves further 
investigations.  
Finally, the Hp2 (Network ties on corporate governance enhance the financial performance of an Italian 
company) is supported. As a matter of fact, results show that if the network ties among different boardrooms 
increase, the financial performance increases (measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA), if we consider all the years in 
our sample (2010-2013). If we analyse results for the year 2013, we find that the research variable Connections 
is positively correlated to Tobin’s Q, whereas, the relationships between Connections and financial performance, 
measured by ROA, is not statistical significant for the year 2013. 
Among control variables, we found that Net Sales and Revenues and Size Board are negatively correlated with 
Tobin’s Q; and Auditor’s Opinion is negatively correlated with ROA if we analyse the dataset regarding all the 
years.  
Figure 1 shows network ties on boardrooms for Italian industrial listed firms in our sample time period 
(2010-2013) created by using Gephi. 
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the effects of Italian network ties on boardrooms and their state of art. Firms may use our results to increase their 
connections among firms in the awareness that this could be effective for firms’ financial performance.  
Some limitations could arise from the fact that huge effects with regard to the introduction of the gender 
minority in Italy could be verified in the medium term, therefore it could be interesting to extend this analysis in 
the next future and over a longer period of analysis. Our negative effects concerning the presence of women on 
financial performance could be linked to some possible problems that could arise in subsequent years of 
significant changes, such as resistance to change or some cultural matters. Future research could be addressed to 
analyse the effect that different roles of women on the boardrooms (e.g. independent versus dependent, executive 
versus non-executive directors etc.) can have on financial performance. Furthermore, it could be interesting to 
analyse the effects that women may have on the overall performance of a listed firm, in terms of financial and 
non-financial measures of performance. Finally, further research could be addressed to examine network ties 
among women on Italian boardrooms and how these connections could have some impacts on the firms’ 
performance. 
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